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DOES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
REQUIRE RELIGION TO BE CONFINED TO 
THE PRIVATE SPHERE? 
Kevin Pybas* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A recurring theme in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is the claim that the First Amendment requires religion to 
be confined to the private sphere.1  In the case that launched the 
Supreme Court’s modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Everson v. 
Board of Education,2 Justice Rutledge, dissenting from the Court’s 
approval of the use of public funds to reimburse transportation costs to 
families whose children attended Catholic schools, objected on the 
ground that religion and religious schooling “is exclusively a private 
affair.”3  Similarly, writing for the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 where 
the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania to supplement the salaries of teachers teaching secular 
subjects in parochial schools, Chief Justice Burger asserted that the 
“Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the 
individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice. . . .”5  Thus, 
the privatization principle, if it may be called that, seeks to deny religion 
any role in public life.6 
                                                 
*  Department of Political Science, Missouri State University; University of Georgia, 
Ph.D.; University of Tulsa, J.D. 
1 See Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy:  A “Privatization” Theory of Religion Clause Cases, 
30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 275 (1986); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith?  Taxes, Politics, and the 
Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2001); Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and 
the Privatization of Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19 (1991).  Bradley, as the title of his article 
suggests, focuses on the way the Supreme Court has used the First Amendment to 
minimize the role of religion in public life.  Myers, on the other hand, focuses not only on 
religion cases but also substantive Due Process Clause cases and the extent to which the 
Court, or various members of it, have sought to limit the role of religious beliefs in 
lawmaking.  Garnett argues that the limitation on political speech and activities imposed 
on religious institutions receiving tax exemptions wrongly communicates the message that 
religion is purely a private matter. 
2 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
3 Id. at 53. 
4 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
5 Id. at 625. 
6 Noting this, Justice Scalia once heatedly accused some of his colleagues of treating 
religion like pornography, as “some purely personal avocation that can be indulged 
entirely in secret . . . in the privacy of one’s room.”  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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While the Supreme Court sought to restrict religion to the private 
sphere through the first four decades or so of its Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, the Rehnquist Court has not followed suit, at least not in 
public assistance cases.7  Instead, it has evinced an openness to religion 
in public life not present in earlier decisions.  Even so, a minority of 
Justices on the Rehnquist Court remain firmly committed to the notion 
that religion should be restricted to the private sphere.  In Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris,8 for example, Justice Souter fiercely objected to the 
Court’s approval of the use of publicly funded tuition vouchers in 
religious schools, proclaiming not only that the Constitution relegates 
religion to the private sphere, but that religious freedom itself is partly 
premised on the notion that religion be kept “relatively private.”9  Justice 
Souter insists that the Establishment Clause banishes religion to the 
private sphere in order to “guarantee the right of individual conscience 
against compulsion, to protect the integrity of religion against the 
corrosion of secular support, and to preserve the unity of political society 
against the implied exclusion of the less favored and the antagonism of 
controversy over public support for religious causes.”10 
The aim of this Article is to critically examine the rationales upon 
which the privatization principle rests:  (1) respect for rights of 
conscience, (2) protection of the health and vigor of religion, and (3) 
preservation of social peace.  I will argue that the reasons given in 
support of the privatization claim are unpersuasive and that, indeed, the 
                                                 
7 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding an Ohio law providing 
tuition assistance to students enrolled in religious schools); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 
(2000) (overruling parts of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and Wolman v. Walter, 
433 U.S. 229 (1977)) (upholding a federal law providing instructional materials, such as 
library books, media materials, and computers, to religious schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 
U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) and Aguilar 
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)) (allowing state-employed teachers to offer instruction in 
remedial and enrichment courses in parochial schools); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that a public university does not violate the 
Establishment Clause when it makes student activity funds available to various student 
groups, including a student-run religious organization, on the basis of neutral criteria); 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing a state-employed sign-
language interpreter to assist a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic high school); see 
also Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (finding no 
constitutional violation in allowing a college student to use neutrally available state 
vocational rehabilitation assistance funds at a Christian college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 
388 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of a Minnesota law allowing parents to take a 
tax deduction for school expenses, irrespective of whether their children attended public, 
private, or parochial schools). 
8 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
9 Id. at 716 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
10 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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stated reasons hardly rise to the level of an argument.  My argument is 
not that Justice Souter and other Justices who wish to confine religion to 
the private sphere are wrong to focus on the rights of conscience, the 
potential for religion to become corrupted, or civic peace, but that they 
do so abstractly, uncritically, and with little attention to the lived, 
historical reality of religion’s involvement in the public sphere.  
Approaching the question from such a high level of abstraction, I argue, 
leads the “privatization” Justices to gloss over real issues of religious 
liberty.  Instead of a deep reflection on the most desirable relationship 
between religion and government in the contemporary context of 
pluralism and a far-reaching regulatory state, the privatization Justices 
dogmatically insist that the Establishment Clause was intended to 
confine religion to the private sphere.  I do not deny that there are good 
reasons why religion should in some circumstances be relegated to the 
private sphere.  However, the facile character of the claim that the 
Constitution always requires it leaves the strong impression that the 
privatization position rests not so much upon a careful sifting of 
evidence or a thoughtful consideration of how religious liberty can be 
advanced for all, but upon unexamined notions about how liberal society 
can be made to work. 
This Article is largely critical.  Thus, I do not explore the 
philosophical commitments that seem to be embedded in the 
privatization position.11  Nor do I try either to defend the Rehnquist 
Court’s greater acceptance of religion in the public sphere or to 
demarcate the appropriate boundary between religion and the state.  
With these caveats in mind, Part II briefly summarizes current 
Establishment Clause doctrine, highlighting the Rehnquist Court’s 
different approaches to religious practices in government schools versus 
public aid that benefits religious schools.  The aim in Part II is not to give 
a detailed account of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence or 
to try to synthesize its various pronouncements on church-state issues.  
Rather, it briefly describes important doctrinal changes the Rehnquist 
                                                 
11 In a companion essay in progress, I explore the extent to which the privatization of 
religion interpretation of the Establishment Clause may be rooted in an understanding of 
the liberal political tradition that regards religion and ways of life rooted in it to be inferior 
to reason and the examined life.  Kevin Pybas, Two Concepts of Liberalism in Establishment 
Clause Jurisprudence, 36 CUMB. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar., 2006).  With a negative view of 
religion as the starting point, the conclusion that the Constitution restricts religion to the 
private sphere seems not so much the result of careful constitutional inquiry but as almost 
foreordained from the outset.  I also consider whether the Rehnquist Court’s qualified 
acceptance of religion in the public sphere is rooted in a different understanding of the 
liberal political tradition and the place of religion in it than that which strictly confines 
religion to the private sphere. 
Pybas: Does the Establishment Clause Require Religion To Be Confined to
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
74 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
Court has fashioned regarding religion in the public sphere.  As the 
Court has become more open to religion in the public sphere, those 
Justices committed to the privatization of religion have been moved to 
explain more thoroughly their views as to why religion should be 
confined to the private sphere.  Part III closely examines these 
arguments, focusing on the rationales given in support of the 
privatization commitment.  While many Justices have been committed to 
confining religion to the private sphere,12 I primarily focus on the 
opinions of Justice Souter, who has more clearly argued the reasons why 
religion should be confined to the private sphere.  Part IV summarizes 
and restates my criticisms of the claim that the Establishment Clause 
restricts religion to the private sphere.   
II.  CONTEMPORARY ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Rehnquist Court draws a distinction between government 
directly supporting or endorsing religion and the expenditure of public 
funds in religious institutions upon the free choice of public aid 
recipients.  In situations involving the government in the direct support 
of religion, the Rehnquist Court has not deviated from earlier judgments 
expressing the unconstitutionality of such practices.13  For example, it 
has invalidated a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolutionary 
theory in public schools and universities unless creation science was also 
taught;14 placement of an unadorned Christian nativity scene inside a 
                                                 
12 Myers noted in 1991 that Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens 
“consistently” sought to confine religion to the private sphere.  Myers, supra note 1, at 79.  
Among current Justices, Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and of course Stevens do so as well.  See 
supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.  Justice Breyer’s commitment to privatizing 
religion seems to be context specific.  For example, he joined Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion in Mitchell, approving of religious schools’ use of instructional materials purchased 
with federal funds.  530 U.S. at 836 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  However, he objected to the 
tuition vouchers at issue in Zelman because they “differ . . . in both kind and degree from aid 
programs upheld in the past.”  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 726.  That is, he objected because the 
vouchers “direct financing to a core function of the church:  the teaching of religious truths 
to young children” and because they involve “a considerable shift of taxpayer dollars from 
public secular schools to private religious schools.”  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 726–27 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  See infra text accompanying notes 173–76. 
13 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (barring commencing the school day with a 
moment of silence for either meditation or voluntary prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 
(1980) (forbidding schools from posting the Ten Commandments in school rooms); 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking a state law prohibiting the teaching of 
evolutionary theory in public schools and universities); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (forbidding commencing the school day with teacher-led Bible reading 
and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (forbidding state-
sponsored nondenominational prayer in which student participation was voluntary). 
14 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
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county courthouse;15 clergy-led public school graduation ceremony 
prayers;16 and student-led prayers at public school athletic events.17  
While the rationales the Court gave for striking each practice included 
the lack of a secular purpose,18 impermissible endorsement,19 and 
governmental coercion,20 the problem was that each law or practice 
involved the government in the direct support or sponsorship of 
religion, which violates the Court’s interpretation that the Establishment 
Clause requires governmental neutrality towards religion. 
“Neutrality” was established as the constitutional benchmark for 
church-state issues in Everson v. Board of Education,21 where the Court 
declared that the Establishment Clause requires “the state to be a neutral 
in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers. . . .”22  The meaning of “neutrality” is not self-evident, but in 
the 1971 decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman23 the Court synthesized its post-
Everson Establishment Clause rulings and famously declared that 
government acts neutrally with regard to religion when its laws have 
secular purposes, the primary effects of which neither promote nor 
hinder religion and do not lead to an “excessive entanglement” of 
religion and the government.24  Although the Lemon test was given as a 
                                                 
15 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
16 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
17 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
18 “In this case, appellants have identified no clear secular purpose for the [law].”  
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585. 
19 “[The county] has chosen to celebrate Christmas in a way that has the effect of 
endorsing a patently Christian message . . . nothing more is required to demonstrate a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.”  County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601–02. 
20 “No holding by this Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a student to 
participate in a religious exercise.  That is being done here, and it is forbidden by the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”  Lee, 505 U.S. at 599.  “Even if we regard 
every high school student’s decision to attend a home football game as purely voluntary, 
we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper 
effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship.”  Santa Fe Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312. 
21 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
22 Id. at 18. 
23 403 U.S. 602. 
24 Id. at 612–13.  The secular purpose test was drawn from Abington School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), where the Court declared unconstitutional laws requiring 
Bible reading without comment in the public schools at the beginning of each school day.  
The primary effect test was first announced in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 
(1968), where the Court affirmed a state law requiring local school districts to lend 
textbooks without charge to parochial school students.  The excessive entanglement prong 
was first articulated in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), where the Court ruled 
that tax exemptions for property owned by religious organizations used exclusively for 
religious purposes do not violate the Establishment Clause. 
Pybas: Does the Establishment Clause Require Religion To Be Confined to
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
76 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
standard for Establishment Clause issues, it is not clear that it has made 
much of a difference in the Court’s treatment of religious practices in 
government institutions.  For example, in the five post-Lemon cases the 
Court decided involving religion in the public schools, Stone v. Graham,25 
Wallace v. Jaffree,26 and Edwards v. Aguillard27 were decided on the basis of 
a lack of a secular purpose, indicating that a three-part test is wholly 
unnecessary for deciding these types of cases.  The other two decisions, 
Lee v. Weisman28 and Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,29 were 
decided without resort to the Lemon test.30  The Lemon test was likewise 
ignored in Marsh v. Chambers,31 where the Court ruled, relying mainly on 
historical grounds, that state legislative chaplains do not violate the 
Establishment Clause.32     
While the Lemon test appears to have had little impact in cases 
involving the government in the direct support of religion, it has 
appeared more prominently in the Court’s effort to distinguish between 
permissible and impermissible governmental aid to religious 
institutions.33  To be sure, as in the religion-in-government cases, the 
                                                 
25 449 U.S. 39, 42–43 (1980) (forbidding schools from posting the Ten Commandments in 
school rooms). 
26 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (barring commencing the school day with a moment of silence 
for either meditation or voluntary prayer). 
27 482 U.S. 578, 597 (1987) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the teaching of 
evolutionary theory in public schools and universities unless creation science was also 
taught). 
28 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
29 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
30 “Our decision in Lee v. Weisman, conspicuously avoided using the supposed [Lemon] 
‘test’ . . . .”  Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
31 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
32 Id. at 792. 
33 See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (finding no 
Lemon violation in allowing a college student to use neutrally available state vocational 
rehabilitation assistance funds at a Christian college); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) 
(forbidding, on entanglement grounds, the use of state and federal aid to employ public 
school teachers in parochial schools for the teaching of remedial, enrichment, and special 
education courses); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (also forbidding, on 
advancement grounds, the use of state and federal aid to employ public school teachers in 
parochial schools for the teaching of remedial, enrichment, and special education courses); 
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (finding no Lemon violation in a Minnesota law 
allowing parents to take a tax deduction for school tuition costs, irrespective of whether 
their children attended public, private, or parochial schools); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & 
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (finding no Lemon violation in a state law 
providing financial reimbursement to religious schools for the costs of state-mandated 
testing and record keeping); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (authorizing state-
funded standardized tests and scoring services and allowing state-employed speech and 
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Court sometimes resolves public aid cases without invoking Lemon.34  
More significantly, the 1997 decision of Agostini v. Felton35 explicitly 
modified the Lemon test in two significant ways regarding its application 
in aid-to-religion cases.  First, the entanglement portion of the Lemon test 
was folded into the effects prong of the test.36  The Court said of itself 
and the Lemon test: 
[T]he factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is 
“excessive” are similar to the factors we use to examine 
“effect.”  That is, to assess entanglement, we have looked to 
“the character and purposes of the institutions that are 
benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and 
the resulting relationship between the government and 
religious authority.”  Similarly, we have assessed a law’s 
“effect” by examining the character of the institutions 
benefited (e.g., whether the religious institutions were 
“predominantly religious”) and the nature of the aid that 
the State provided (e.g., whether it was neutral and 
nonideological).37  
Thus, in aid cases, Agostini reduces the Lemon test into a two-part 
inquiry:  whether the law has a secular purpose and whether its effect is 
                                                                                                             
hearing therapists, counselors, doctors, and nurses to examine parochial school students on 
school grounds, but forbidding public schools from loaning instructional materials to 
parochial schools, on advancement grounds and disallowing the use of public funds for 
field trip transportation for parochial school students, on entanglement grounds); Meek v. 
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (allowing secular textbooks purchased with public funds to 
be loaned to religious schools, but disallowing, on advancement grounds, the use of 
instructional materials purchased with public money and prohibiting the provision of 
auxiliary services, such as counseling and speech and hearing therapy, on excessive 
entanglement grounds); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
(1973) (striking a New York law on advancement grounds that provided various forms of 
public assistance to private schools and families with children enrolled in them, most of 
which were religiously affiliated); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (declaring 
unconstitutional, on excessive entanglement grounds, state laws that supplemented the 
salaries of teachers teaching secular subjects in religious schools). 
34 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that a 
public university does not violate the Establishment Clause when it makes student activity 
funds available to various student groups, including a student-run religious organization, 
on the basis of neutral criteria); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (no 
Establishment Clause violation in allowing a state-employed sign-language interpreter to 
assist a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic high school). 
35 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (partially overruling Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 
(1985) and overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)). 
36 Id. at 232. 
37 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (citations omitted). 
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the advancement of religion.  Second, more significantly, is the way 
Agostini unambiguously altered the inquiry into whether a law advances 
religion.  Prior to Agostini, advancement of religion had generally been 
present if the aid provided could be used to support the religious 
mission of the religious institution.   
To this end, the Court generally drew a line between aid that it 
believed could be limited in its use to secular purposes only and aid that 
could not be so limited.  Consequently, the Court permitted aid that 
supplied things, such as secular textbooks38 and health and therapeutic 
services,39 but not aid that was used to purchase instructional materials40 
or to provide remedial and enrichment courses.41  However, in Agostini, 
the Court noted that its rulings in Witters v. Washington Department of 
Services for the Blind42 and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District43 had 
called into question its project of categorizing aid either as secular or 
religious.  The more telling inquiry, the Court reasoned, was whether the 
advancement of religion was attributable to the state or to individuals 
exercising “genuinely independent and private choices.”44  Judgments 
about whether a law provides genuine choice between secular and 
religious alternatives, in turn, depend on whether “the aid is allocated on 
the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor[s] nor disfavor[s] 
religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries 
on a nondiscriminatory basis.”45  In other words, laws that provide 
neutrally available public funds on the basis of secular criteria, such as 
financial need, and that provide no incentives for recipients to choose 
religious alternatives are nevertheless constitutional even when the 
funds are used to further religion.  In such instances, the “advancement 
of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious 
message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the 
government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.”46  
Agostini thus made it clear that the central inquiry in public assistance 
cases was not whether aid could be limited to secular purposes.  Rather, 
the inquiry is whether funds directly further religion, which is forbidden, 
                                                 
38 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
39 E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
40 Id. 
41 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 
(1985). 
42 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
43 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
44 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (citing Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for 
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)). 
45 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231. 
46 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002). 
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or whether religion is advanced by the free and independent choices of 
aid recipients, which is acceptable.47   
Agostini therefore seemed to clearly signal a certain acceptance on 
the Court’s behalf of religion in public life that previous cases such as 
Mueller v. Allen,48 Witters,49 and Zobrest50 had prefigured.  The Court 
confirmed its tolerance of religion in the public sphere in Mitchell v. 
Helms,51 where it reversed course to permit the use of publicly-purchased 
instructional materials, such as library books, media materials, and 
computers, in religious schools.  Moreover, the Court’s most recent aid 
case ruling, that a state law providing tuition assistance to students 
enrolled in religious schools does not violate the Establishment Clause, 
would seem to solidify its current position on religion in public life. 52 
What then can we say about the Rehnquist Court’s approach to 
Establishment Clause issues?  It seems its approach seeks not so much to 
confine religion to the private sphere but to forbid the government’s 
direct support of it.  Religious practices in government, such as the 
public schools, inescapably involve the government in the direct support 
of religion.  To avoid this, a majority of the Rehnquist Court continues to 
insist that the Establishment Clause requires religion to be confined to 
the private sphere.  “The design of the Constitution,” Justice Kennedy 
wrote for the Court in 1992, “is that preservation and transmission of 
religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed 
to the private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pursue that 
mission.”53  However, the support of religion present in religion-neutral 
assistance programs in which individual aid recipients direct public 
funds to secular and religious alternatives of their choosing is 
attributable to individual choice, not to the government.  In such 
                                                 
47 Thus, the Court in Agostini ruled that there is no constitutional prohibition to applying 
public funds to remedial and enrichment courses in religious schools when such funds are 
provided to all students meeting secular eligibility requirements when there is some 
modest monitoring scheme in place to make sure that publicly-paid teachers do not engage 
in religious instruction.  Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234–35.  To this end, Agostini completely 
overruled Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and partially overruled Grand Rapids School 
District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
48 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (finding no Establishment Clause violation in a Minnesota law 
allowing parents of all school age children to take a tax deduction for school tuition costs, 
including parents whose children are enrolled in religious schools). 
49 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
50 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
51 530 U.S. 793, 835–36 (2000) (overruling portions of Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 
(1975) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 (1977)). 
52 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002). 
53 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992). 
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circumstances, individual choice severs the link between government 
and the advancement of religion.  Yet, with religious practices in public 
schools, there is no individual choice that can be exercised that would 
cut the impermissible tie between government and the support of 
religion.  The support of religion present in this context thus seems 
unavoidably attributable to government.  
Focusing on the requirement that government act neutrally towards 
religion helps illustrate the Court’s two-track approach to these issues.  If 
religious practices in governmental institutions necessarily involve 
government in the advancement of religion, government has then failed 
to act neutrally with regard to religion, which the Court has construed to 
be the command of the Establishment Clause since Everson.54  To ensure 
that government acts neutrally with regard to religion in terms of its own 
practices, the Court has consistently insisted that religion be restricted to 
the private sphere.  But what does the principle of neutrality require 
regarding neutrally available governmental assistance programs?  Lemon 
and its progeny typically ruled that the government had advanced 
religion or acted non-neutrally towards religion when public funds were 
spent in a way that could be used for religious purposes.55  The Court’s 
movement away from classifying the aid in question as supporting either 
the secular or religious aspects of a religious institution56 has led to a 
reconceptualization of what neutrality means vis-à-vis neutral assistance 
programs.  As the majority opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris57 
indicates, neutrality, understood as “evenhandedness” between religious 
and secular alternatives, now appears to be the singular standard 
employed by the Court for judging the constitutionality of aid programs 
where public funds wind up in the treasury of religious schools.58  That 
                                                 
54 See supra text accompanying notes 21–22. 
55 See supra text accompanying notes 35–41. 
56 See supra text accompanying notes 41–47. 
57 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
58 Id. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878 (2000) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (describing three different meanings the Court has ascribed to the 
word “neutrality”:  “as a term to describe the requisite state of government equipoise 
between the forbidden encouragement and discouragement of religion; to characterize a 
benefit or aid as secular; and to indicate evenhandedness in distributing it”).  The plurality 
opinion in Mitchell treated evenhandedness as the sole constitutional measure, a conclusion 
criticized by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion and by Justice Souter in his 
dissent.  Id. at 837–40 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Id. at 869, 900 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(stating that the plurality “espouses a new conception of neutrality as a practically 
sufficient test of constitutionality that would, if adopted by the Court, eliminate inquiry 
into a law’s effects,” and the plurality “appears to take evenhandedness neutrality and in 
practical terms promote it to a single and sufficient test for the establishment 
constitutionality of school aid”).  However, Justice O’Connor now appears to agree that 
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is, so long as government assistance programs have a secular purpose 
and neither define aid recipients on the basis of religion nor attempt to 
steer recipients toward the religious alternatives by, for instance, 
providing greater assistance to recipients who choose the religious 
alternative, there is no violation of the neutrality requirement when 
recipients themselves direct the funds to religious institutions.59   
Four Justices, led by Justice Souter, argue that evenhandedness alone 
is not an acceptable constitutional yardstick.  Instead, evenhandedness 
“is to be considered only along with other characteristics of aid, its 
administration, its recipients, or its potential that have been emphasized 
over the years as indicators of just how religious the intent and effect of a 
given aid scheme really is.”60  On this view, even a genuinely neutral 
public aid program61 that ends up subsidizing the religious mission of 
religious schools through the free and independent choices of aid 
recipients is unconstitutional.62  This is so, Justice Souter argues, because 
public aid that supports the religious mission of a religious institution 
violates “every objective supposed to be served by the bar against 
                                                                                                             
evenhandedness alone satisfies the First Amendment, giving it precedential value that the 
Mitchell plurality opinion could not.  See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 669–70 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 696 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
59 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653–54. 
60 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 884 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
61 It should be noted that Justice Souter denies that the voucher program at issue in 
Zelman is neutral.  In his view, the voucher program provides recipients with a financial 
incentive to select religious schooling.  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 697–98 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
The Zelman majority, on the other hand, concluded that the program provides financial 
incentives for public schooling.  Id. at 653–54 (majority opinion).  The dispute as to whether 
the voucher program provided incentives or disincentives for religious schooling is beyond 
my interest here, but it is worth noting that the disagreement seems to turn on how to 
count the amount of state funding available to students choosing to remain in public 
school.  Justice Souter focuses on the fact that the state of Ohio offers up to $2,250 tuition 
assistance for students who opt out of the Cleveland public schools but only up to $324 in 
tutoring assistance for the students choosing to remain in the Cleveland public schools, 
which seemingly provides a financial incentive to opt out of public schooling.  Id. at 697–98 
(Souter, J., dissenting).  However, the majority focuses on the fact that the amount of state 
money going to Cleveland public schools, including community and magnet schools, is 
two to three times more than can be paid to a religious school.  Id. at 654 (majority opinion).  
The majority also emphasizes that children choosing to remain in public school have no co-
pay obligation but that families choosing private schooling are obligated to pay a portion of 
the private school tuition, which creates an additional disincentive to choose religious 
schooling.  Id. 
62 “[T]he basic principle of establishment scrutiny of aid remains the principle . . . that 
there may be no public aid to religion or support for the religious mission of any 
institution.”  Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 884 (Souter, J., dissenting).  “[E]ven a genuine choice 
criterion is [not] up to the task of the Establishment Clause when substantial state funds go 
to religious [schooling]. . . .”  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 703 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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establishment.”63  These objectives include “respect for freedom of 
conscience . . . , sav[ing] religion from its own corruption,”64 and 
“protecting the Nation’s social fabric from religious conflict. . . .”65  I now 
wish to turn to an examination of each of these rationales underpinning 
the privatization thesis.  
III.  THE PRIVATIZATION RATIONALES 
As I noted at the outset, rights of conscience, the potential for 
government to harm religion, and social peace are not inappropriate 
objects of concern.  However, the burden of this Part of this Article is to 
illustrate the superficial character of the scrutiny Justice Souter and other 
adherents of the privatization thesis grant these issues.  
A. Freedom of Conscience   
Justice Souter opposes the expenditure of neutrally available public 
funds in religious schools on the grounds that Thomas Jefferson’s 
Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom and James Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments “establish clearly 
that liberty of personal conviction requires freedom from coercion to 
support religion, and this means that the government can compel no aid 
to fund it.”66  Specifically, Justice Souter cites Jefferson for the 
proposition that neutrally available funds spent in religious schools 
violate rights of conscience by infringing upon the principles that “no 
one ‘shall be compelled to . . . support any religious worship, place, or 
ministry whatsoever’“67 and that: 
[C]ompelling a man to furnish contributions of money 
for propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is 
sinful and tyrannical; . . . even the forcing him to support 
this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is 
                                                 
63 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 708 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870–72 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that public support of religion “violates the fundamental principle of 
freedom of conscience,” “corrupts religion,” and “is inextricably linked with conflict”). 
65 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
66 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
67 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing A Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom, in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 84 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987)).  The title of the document Justice Souter purports to be citing does not match the 
page number he gives.  Jefferson’s A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom is reprinted in the 
Kurland and Lerner volume at page seventy-seven.  On page eighty-four is the Virginia Act 
for Establishing Religious Freedom.  However, it makes no difference which document Justice 
Souter intended to cite because the passages he relies on are in both documents. 
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depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his 
contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he 
would make his pattern.68 
Madison is cited for the belief that freedom of conscience is violated “by 
any ‘authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence . . . of 
his property for the support of any . . . establishment.’”69  Taken together, 
Jefferson’s Act and Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance establish that 
“‘[a]ny tax to establish religion is antithetical to the command that the 
minds of men always be wholly free.’”70   
There are several possible objections to Justice Souter’s claim that 
Jefferson and Madison authoritatively established that the use of 
neutrally available public funds in religious schools amounts to 
despotism over the mind.  One objection I will note but not pursue is 
Justice Souter’s belief that the outcome of the debate in Virginia in the 
1780s over religious freedom, in which Madison and Jefferson played 
such prominent roles, has constitutional status.  This, of course, is not a 
new claim71 and many objections have been raised against it.72  Suffice it 
to say, given the “widespread and deep division[s]” 73 over the meaning 
                                                 
68 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 871 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947)). 
69 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Memorial and Remonstrance ¶ 3, 
reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 65–66). 
70 Id. (citation omitted). 
71 In Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court declared that “the provisions of the 
First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played 
such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same 
protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the [Virginia Bill for 
Religious Liberty],” originally written by Jefferson.  330 U.S. at 13.  More recently, Justice 
Souter has declared that Madison’s “authority on questions about the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause is well settled.”  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
72 See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE:  THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).  In commenting upon the claim in the majority 
opinion of Everson that the Establishment Clause has the same meaning as Jefferson’s 
Statute for Religious Freedom, Smith notes that “the Court took no notice of the obvious 
objection to imposing the Virginia policy on a constitutional provision that had an entirely 
different wording and that was adopted by a different, and very differently composed, 
body.”  Id. at 46. 
73 Daniel O. Conkle, Legal Theory:  Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 
NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1133 (1988).  Given the profound disagreement over the meaning of 
religious freedom in the late eighteenth century, Conkle asks: 
[H]ow could Congress and the ratifying state legislatures have reached 
agreement on the [E]stablishment [C]lause?  It was supported, after all, 
both by separationists and by those who were committed to programs 
of state-sponsored religion.  These various political actors simply could 
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of religious liberty in the late eighteenth century, it is exceedingly 
unlikely that the men in Congress and the state legislatures that ratified 
                                                                                                             
not have agreed on a general principle governing the relationship of 
religion and government, whether it be the principle endorsed in 
Everson or any other.  If the [E]stablishment [C]lause had embraced 
such a principle, it would not have been enacted. 
Id. (citation omitted).  Conkle goes on to argue that the Establishment Clause is simply a 
jurisdictional statement making it clear that in denying Congress the authority to pass any 
“law respecting the establishment of religion,” the Constitution had not withdrawn 
legislative authority over religion from the states.  Id.  Similar arguments are made by 
several scholars.  Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 293 (2002).  Carter insists that: 
Surely the [Establishment] [C]lause means what it says, and no more 
than that.  At the moment of the founding, the majority of states had 
official, state-supported, established churches, and all but two required 
religious tests for public office.  The states were not giving these 
powers away.  On the contrary, they wanted to protect their own 
established churches from interference by the new national 
government, and also wanted to prevent that national government 
from establishing a church of its own. 
Id. at 299; Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term:  Foreword:  Revolutions?, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 13, 52–53 (1995) (“There is little doubt that the Establishment Clause, (quite apart 
from its opening words ‘Congress shall make no law[s]’), was specifically intended to 
preserve a freedom of action to the states while denying it to the national government.”); 
Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology:  A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 233, 307 (1989) (“The language of the [Establishment] [C]lause was directed against 
congressional creation of a national church or favoritism of one ecclesiastical sect over 
another.  Thus, its predominant intent was to protect state religious establishments from 
national displacement.”).  Smith notes that there was widespread support in America in the 
late eighteenth century for the notion that religion was necessary for good republican 
government, but there was sharp disagreement over whether government itself should 
promote religion or whether religion should be left to private, voluntary initiatives.  Smith, 
supra note 72, at 19–22.  Given this disagreement, Smith, like the authors noted above, 
argues that the Establishment Clause is simply a jurisdictional statement but also insists 
that the Free Exercise Clause is as well.  Id. at 35–43.  “Given the controversies that in fact 
existed in the new nation over ‘Free Exercise’ issues, it seems most plausible to understand 
the Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, as expressing a jurisdictional 
decision to leave substantive issues [of religious freedom] to be resolved by the states.”  Id. 
at 42.  However, Douglas Laycock argues that the federalism interpretation of the religion 
clause is mistaken and that the Establishment Clause does in fact protect individual rights.  
See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty:  
Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 241–43 (2004); Douglas 
Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion:  A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 875, 885–94 (1986). 
 The claim that the Establishment Clause is simply a federalism provision intended to 
prohibit Congress from interfering with state establishments raises a host of questions I 
have not the space to address.  For example, it calls into question the coherence of 
“incorporating” the Establishment Clause against the states.  See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 677–80 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  Another question raised by the federalism claim is the extent to 
which Congress could have moved against state establishments under some expressly 
enumerated power in Article I. 
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the First Amendment believed that they were writing into the 
Constitution the views of Jefferson and Madison to the exclusion of all 
others.   
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the Establishment 
Clause is simply a restatement of Jefferson’s and Madison’s views.  The 
question then is:  Do their views unmistakably establish that 
governmental programs of the type at issue in Mitchell and Zelman 
represent a tyranny over the mind?  In other words, is “the command 
‘that the minds of men always be wholly free’“74 violated when 
government aid is spent in religious schools “‘only as a result of the 
genuinely independent and private choices of individuals’”?75  The first 
difficulty one encounters in trying to answer this question involves the 
not insignificant challenge of applying Jefferson’s and Madison’s 
principles of religious liberty to a world quite different from the one in 
which they were articulated.  To give but one example—if an example is 
needed—consider that the expenditures of the federal government for 
the period 1789–1791 were $4,269,000,76 but by 2002 they had grown to 
exceed $2 trillion.77  This says nothing of the growth of state and local 
governments over this period78 nor of the exponentially increased reach 
of all levels of government into the lives of citizens today.  Because of the 
great difficulty of computing the relative value of a dollar, it is difficult 
to conclude, with any precision, just how much larger the federal 
government is today as compared to 1791.  The point, though, is that 
given that Jefferson’s and Madison’s views on religious liberty were part 
of a set of beliefs that also included belief in limited government, does it 
make sense to invoke the former when we have rejected the latter?79   
                                                 
74 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 711 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793, 871 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 12). 
75 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997)). 
76 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:  COLONIAL 
TIMES TO 1970, PART 2 1115 (1976) (containing a table entitled “Outlays of the Federal 
Government:  1789–1970”). 
77 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H. DOC. 108–45, at tbl. B-82 (2004), available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy05/pdf/2004_erp.pdf.  
78 Total state and local government spending in 2002 was about $1.4 trillion.  Id. 
79 Smith writes that: 
[F]ollowing Locke, Jefferson’s views about religious freedom [] rested 
heavily on a minimalist conception of the proper functions of the state.  
That minimalist conception hardly commands a consensus today.  
Hence, it is unclear why current judges or legal scholars should feel 
entitled to invoke Locke’s or Jefferson’s conclusions about religious 
freedom when they reject the premises from which those conclusions 
were derived. 
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I am not sure how to begin to answer the question.  However, it 
seems to me that some explanation is in order if someone wishes to 
claim, as Justice Souter does, that Jefferson’s and Madison’s principles of 
religious liberty unequivocally establish that the use of public funds in 
religious schools by means of religiously neutral criteria and the 
individual choices of aid recipients constitutes despotism over the mind.  
Some explanation that would, at a minimum, attempt to explain why in 
circumstances of an expansive bureaucratic state the indirect support of 
religion—as in Mitchell and Zelman—is anymore “antithetical to the 
command ‘that the minds of men always be wholly free’” than other 
public expenditures to which people object.80  Perhaps Justice Souter is 
right, that even in the modern regulatory state wherein government 
spends few of the trillions of dollars it spends each year in a way that 
fails to offend any number of people, indirect public support of religion 
nevertheless represents a tyranny over the mind.  Yet it behooves him to 
explain how this is true.  Unfortunately, Justice Souter and other Justices 
committed to the privatization of religion convey not a hint of believing 
that there is any complexity to the issue.  The sprawling growth of the 
government over the last two centuries and the enormous extension of 
its reach into the lives of citizens is something that Justice Souter simply 
does not note.  For him and the other privatization Justices, the use of 
neutrally available public funds in religious institutions amounts 
straightforwardly to an establishment of religion that tyrannizes the 
minds of citizens. 
Having raised the question of whether the demise of limited 
government undermines Justice Souter’s application of Jefferson’s and 
Madison’s principles to invalidate the expenditure of neutrally available 
public funds in religious schools, let us return to the substantive issue of 
whether Jefferson’s Act and Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance clearly 
establish that the use of such funds in this way actually amounts to the 
establishment of religion and, hence, to a tyranny over the mind.81  
                                                                                                             
Smith, supra note 72, at 148–49 n.24. 
80 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 871. 
81 Recall that in support of his claim that the expenditure of neutrally available public 
funds in religious schools violates rights of conscience, Justice Souter invokes Jefferson for 
the principle that “no one ‘shall be compelled to . . . support any religious worship, place, 
or ministry whatsoever’” and for the contention that:   
[C]ompel[ling] a man to furnish contributions of money for 
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical 
. . . even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own 
religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of 
giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he 
would make his pattern. 
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Recent scholarship suggests that Justice Souter is wrong on this score, at 
least regarding Madison and the Memorial and Remonstrance.  
Vincent Phillip Muñoz argues that Madison’s central teaching of 
religious liberty is that the state may not take “cognizance” of religion.82  
In the Memorial and Remonstrance, after first arguing that religion is an 
inalienable natural right, Madison writes that “therefore that in matters 
of Religion, no mans [sic] right is abridged by the institution of Civil 
Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”83  What 
the “noncognizance” of religion requirement means, writes Muñoz, is 
that the state:  
[L]acks jurisdiction over religion.  It may not take 
authoritative notice of or perceive religion or the 
religious affiliation of its citizens.  A government 
noncognizant of religion, in other words, must be blind 
to religion.  It cannot use religion or religious 
preferences as a basis for classifying citizens.  This is the 
doctrinal teaching of the “Memorial and Remonstrance.”  
The state, which is a product of the social compact 
between men originally born in the state of nature, must 
remain noncognizant of religion because religion is not 
part of the social compact.  Religion cannot be part of the 
social compact because of the inalienable character of 
man’s right to direct his religion according to conviction 
and conscience.84 
Under the noncognizance principle, government “must remain blind 
to religion as such.  It can neither privilege religion nor punish citizens 
on account of their religion.”85  If Madison is the authoritative guide to 
the Establishment Clause, as Justice Souter claims,86 a “Madisonian 
approach to the First Amendment would utilize the straightforward rule 
that the state must remain noncognizant of religion.  No state actor or 
                                                                                                             
See supra text accompanying notes 67–70.  Madison is cited for the idea that freedom of 
conscience is violated “by any ‘authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence 
. . . of his property for the support of any . . . establishment.’”  See supra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
82 Vincent Phillip Muñoz, James Madison’s Principle of Religious Liberty, 97 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 17, 22–23 (2003). 
83 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONST. 82 (1987). 
84 Muñoz, supra note 82, at 23. 
85 Id. at 29. 
86 See supra note 71. 
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government policy could classify, punish, distribute, or withhold 
benefits from individual citizens or organizations on account of religion 
or religious affiliation.”87  In other words, the Constitution must be 
“religion-blind.”88   
Muñoz’s interpretation of Madison’s claim that religion is “wholly 
exempt” from the state’s “cognizance” is supported by Vincent Blasi.  
Like Muñoz, Blasi argues that Madison’s principle of noncognizance of 
religion means that the state has no “jurisdiction” over religion or 
“responsibility” for it.89  As Blasi explains, the noncognizance principle 
means that the state “has no authority to attempt to influence, facilitate, 
or promote . . . [religious] beliefs and practices.  That responsibility 
belongs exclusively to the individual believer and the voluntary 
associations he forms.”90  Moreover, for Madison, the state’s failure to 
respect the noncongnizance principle meant that it had established 
religion.  Blasi contends that a “religious establishment,” according to 
Madison, was “any instance of government taking ‘cognizance’ of, that is 
responsibility for, religion.”91  Blasi argues, in other words, that 
Madison’s notion of the separation of church and state did not seek to 
confine religion to the private sphere.  Rather, Madison believed it was 
necessary to deny government any authority over the religious beliefs of 
citizens.  As Madison wrote in the Memorial and Remonstrance, “[t]he 
Religion . . . of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of 
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may 
dictate . . . .  It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such 
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him.”92  
Separation of church and state for Madison then requires “a separation 
                                                 
87 Muñoz, supra note 82, at 29.  Muñoz claims only that the noncognizance approach to 
religion represents Madison’s view, not that it also represents the intent of the men who 
ratified the First Amendment.  Id. at 29 n.38. 
88 Id. at 29.  In the Free Exercise Clause context, Muñoz argues that the principle of 
noncongizance “prohibits the government from making laws that single out a religion or 
religion generally for unfavorable treatment.  It would also deny the government the 
authority to make laws or exemptions singling out a religion or religion generally for 
favorable treatment under the law.”  Id. at 31.  Muñoz thus concludes that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1990), declaring that the Free 
Exercise Clause does not exempt religious individuals and groups from laws of general 
applicability that incidentally burden religion, is consistent with Madison’s noncognizance 
principle.  Muñoz, supra note 82, at 31. 
89 Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty:  Seven Questions from Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 789 (2002). 
90 Id. at 790. 
91 Id. at 791. 
92 Madison, supra note 83, at 82. 
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of functions and purposes, not some quixotic attempt to achieve a 
hermetically sealed spatial separation.”93   
Applying the noncognizance principle to issues that the Supreme 
Court has decided helps illustrate the Madisonian approach.  For 
example, Muñoz persuasively makes the case that the Court violated 
Madison’s principle in Marsh v. Chambers,94 upholding the 
constitutionality of publicly-funded legislative chaplains, and in Walz v. 
Tax Commissioners of New York City,95 finding no constitutional violation 
in granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for 
property used solely for religious worship.  Both conclusions violate the 
noncognizance principle in that government took “authoritative notice of 
religion.”  Marsh violated the noncognizance principle in that the hiring 
of a chaplain involves a hiring based on religion and the chaplain’s 
prayers promote a religious exercise.  The same is true in Walz because 
the Court conferred a benefit on the basis of religion.96  By the same 
token, Muñoz argues that the decisions removing official religious 
practices from the public schools are consistent with the principle of 
noncognizance in that government, quite obviously, takes note of 
religion when it promotes religious activities.97  
Moreover, Muñoz convincingly contends that “[t]he principle of 
‘noncognizance’ . . .  forbids the state from using religious affiliation to 
exclude individuals or organizations from generally available benefits.”98  
To this end, Muñoz argues that the Court’s decisions in Mueller v. Allen99 
and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia100 were 
consistent with the Madisonian approach.  The law at issue in Mueller 
entitled all families with children enrolled in elementary and secondary 
schools to take a tax deduction for education expenses, which benefited 
families enrolled in religious schools.  However, because the tax 
exemption was available to all families with school-age children, the law 
“did not inquire into the religious character of the child’s school,” which 
meant that “the state remained noncognizant of religion.”101  However, 
in Rosenberger, the University of Virginia did take cognizance of religion 
                                                 
93 Blasi, supra note 89, at 791. 
94 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
95 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
96 Muñoz, supra note 82, at 29. 
97 Id. at 30. 
98 Id. 
99 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
100 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
101 Muñoz, supra note 82, at 30. 
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by inquiring into the religious character of student groups that applied 
for student-activity funds that were available on the basis of nonreligious 
criteria.  The Supreme Court declared the policy unconstitutional 
because it violated the free speech rights of a Christian student 
organization, but as Muñoz argues: 
A Madisonian interpretation of the First Amendment 
would have reached the same result on the grounds that 
to deny a student newspaper generally available 
newspaper funds because their paper contains religious 
content subjects religious students to a particular 
disability.  The university became unconstitutionally 
cognizant of religion by singling out religious activities 
for exclusion from generally available funds.102   
In other words, once the university chose to fund student newspapers, in 
order to remain “blind to religion,” it could not inquire into the religious 
character of the newspapers.  Regarding the issue of public funds going 
to religious schools, Muñoz argues that:  
[T]he Madisonian approach would adjudicate the issue 
like any other policy of governmental funding.  The 
government may not use religious affiliation as a 
classification or criterion for either privilege or penalty.  
The government may not fund schools because they are 
religious, but it also may not fund schools only because 
they have a religious affiliation.  If the government 
chooses to adopt a general policy to fund educational 
programs in public and private schools, it may not adopt 
standards that take religion into account.103   
The “religion-blind” requirement, as Muñoz notes,104 supports the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the religious schooling context, 
permitting the use of a publicly-funded sign-language interpreter by a 
student enrolled in a Catholic school,105 publicly-funded teachers 
teaching enrichment and remedial courses in religious schools,106 loaning 
instructional materials purchased with public money to religious 
                                                 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 30–31. 
104 Id. at 31. 
105 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1993). 
106 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234–35 (1997). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 [2005], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol40/iss1/3
2005] Religion Confined to the Private Sphere? 91 
schools,107 and religious schools’ participation in a publicly-funded 
voucher program.108  If religious interests had been denied the ability to 
participate in general funding programs, as Justice Souter would have 
done in pursuit of the privatization of religion,109 the Court would have 
imposed a particular burden on religion, which the noncognizance 
principle forbids.  
Blasi focuses only on the issue of religious school vouchers, and he 
too concludes that they do not violate Madison’s principle of 
noncognizance.  That is, vouchers do not “place the state in the position 
of taking responsibility for the religious beliefs of its citizens.”110  Blasi 
writes: 
There are secular educational objectives served by a 
voucher system that are not bound up with the religious 
beliefs of its participants.  Even when those secular 
educational benefits are delivered by religious authority 
figures, acting out of religious motives and functioning 
in a “pervasively sectarian” environment, the state has 
not adopted an educational strategy that gives it a stake 
in the religious beliefs of its citizens.111   
In the cases Muñoz analyzes, the Supreme Court did not claim to be 
following Madison’s principle of noncognizance.  However, it seems that 
its analysis in aid cases is now essentially a “noncognizance” inquiry.  
That is, Zelman makes clear that public assistance laws pass 
Establishment Clause scrutiny so long as they have a secular purpose 
and neither define recipients on the basis of religion nor attempt to direct 
recipients to religious alternatives, even when significant amounts of 
public money end up in religious schools.112  The secular purpose 
requirement and the requirement to distribute aid on the basis of 
nonreligious criteria are investigations, under the modified Lemon test, 
into whether the government has acted neutrally with regard to 
                                                 
107 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835–36 (2000). 
108 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002). 
109 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867 (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 240 (Souter, J., dissenting); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 14 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Souter). 
110 Blasi, supra note 89, at 790.  However, Blasi notes that Madison raises other issues in 
Memorial and Remonstrance that may lead one to reject religious school vouchers.  Id. at 787–
88. 
111 Blasi, supra note 89, at 790. 
112 See supra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
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religion.113  Asking whether a law is neutral or evenhanded114 is also to 
ask whether the state has taken congnizance of religion.  Nonneutrality 
indicates cognizance of religion, which denotes an establishment of 
religion in Madisonian terms and is prohibited.  In the public assistance 
cases, then, the Court now seems to perform basically a Madisonian 
noncognizance inquiry.  If Muñoz’s interpretation of Madison is correct, 
there is more than a little irony in Justice Souter’s dogged insistence that 
the Court has betrayed Madison in its recent public assistance 
pronouncements.  Instead, it is his use of religious affiliation as a 
classification for penalizing citizens that contravenes Madison’s principle 
of religious liberty. 
In addition to questioning Justice Souter’s rather simplistic 
understanding of Madison and Jefferson, let us consider more directly 
the concept of “freedom of conscience.”  Irrespective of the best reading 
of Jefferson’s and Madison’s principles, it seems strange to claim that my 
rights of conscience are violated when others are permitted to share in a 
governmental resource that they also have contributed to and from 
which I already have drawn.  For example, my family resided in the 
State of Ohio earlier this decade when the Cleveland voucher program 
was in place and when the Court decided Zelman.  In the year following 
the Zelman decision, the 2002–2003 academic year, my children and over 
1.8 million other children were enrolled in Ohio elementary and 
secondary public schools.115  By contrast, at that time about 4,200 
students in the Cleveland district were using their education vouchers in 
religious schools.116  Justice Souter claims that such expenditures violate 
the rights of conscience of all citizens of Ohio.  But in what sense were 
my rights or the rights of anyone violated by the use of vouchers in 
religious schools?  The vouchers support education,117 not a minister, 
missionary, or the like.  No one’s taxes were increased in order to 
channel money to religious schools.  The state’s claim on me, such as my 
tax obligation, was the same whether religious schools participated in 
the voucher program or not.  Furthermore, the use of voucher funds in 
religious schools did not interfere with my family’s—nor would I argue 
                                                 
113 See supra text accompanying notes 36–47. 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
115 Ohio Department of Education 2004–2005 Fact Sheet, at http://www.ode.state.oh.us/ 
faq/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). 
116 Amy Hanauer, Cleveland School Vouchers:  Where the Students Go (2002), at 
http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/WhereStudentsGo.pdf. 
117 “There is no dispute that the program challenged here was enacted for the valid 
secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably 
failing public school system.”  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002). 
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with anyone else’s—ability to live by our own best lights, that is, 
according to the beliefs and values that give meaning and purpose to our 
lives, that which makes our lives our own.      
In other words, it seems to me that to find a genuine infringement of 
rights of conscience there must be some real interference with what the 
political philosopher William Galston calls “expressive liberty.”  Galston 
defines this concept as “[t]he ability of individuals and groups to live in 
ways consistent with their understanding of what gives meaning and 
purpose to life. . . .”118  Governmental interference with rights of 
conscience denies individuals and groups the right to define how they 
would live.  It is to compel others to live in a way they would not live 
but for the governmental compulsion.119   
What Galston’s discussion of freedom of conscience suggests is that 
there has been no violation of rights of conscience and expressive liberty 
unless government meddles into the lives of citizens in a way that 
interferes with their ability to live according to their own best lights.  To 
this end, Galston argues that compulsory flag salute and Pledge of 
Allegiance laws that require some citizens to violate their religious 
beliefs are forbidden infringements upon conscience.120  Such laws 
interfered, without a compelling governmental interest, with the ability 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses to live and raise their children according to the 
dictates of their consciences.  It is precisely this element of interference 
with one’s way of life that is missing from Justice Souter’s claim that the 
use of neutrally available public funds in religious schools violates rights 
of conscience.  As I stated, the expenditure of public funds in religious 
schools by means of neutral governmental programs involves absolutely 
no interference with the ability of citizens to live according to their own 
best lights.  One may believe that funding programs such as those at 
                                                 
118 William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty and Constitutional Democracy:  The Case of Freedom 
of Conscience, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 149, 177 (2003). 
119 Galston does not claim that the right of expressive liberty is an unlimited right, for as 
he adds “[i]t may rightly be limited, but only to the extent necessary to secure the 
institutional conditions for its exercise.”  Id.  While freedom of conscience and expressive 
liberty may at times be legitimately curtailed, they “enjoy[] a rebuttable presumption to 
prevail in the face of public law.”  Id. at 176.  That is, “‘governmental infringements upon 
. . . conscientious claims would be sustainable in court only if it were shown that they were 
necessary for compelling governmental interests.’”  Id. 
120 Id.  Galston focuses on Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), where 
the Supreme Court affirmed the right of public schools to expel Jehovah’s Witness students 
who refused to say the pledge and salute the flag on religious grounds.  Minersville was 
overruled on free speech grounds in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624 (1943). 
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issue in Zobrest, Agostini, Mitchell, and Zelman are unwise, even foolish, 
but they in no way impair one’s ability to believe and live as one sees fit.  
One is free to continue believing or not believing whatever one does 
about God and to continue worshiping or not worshiping God in the 
same way as before the institution of the programs.  Likewise, one is free 
to continue raising children as before, to pursue what one values, and to 
set and follow one’s life plan.  In short, it is difficult to understand how, 
per Justice Souter, rights of conscience are violated when neutrally 
available public assistance is routed to religious schools by the 
independent choices of aid recipients. 
A critic might object that Justice Souter is merely relying on the 
authority of Madison for his claim about rights of conscience and that 
my real quarrel is with Madison.  However, as the discussion of Muñoz’s 
and Blasi’s interpretations of the Memorial and Remonstrance suggests, 
religion-neutral government programs are not instances of government 
taking congnizance of, or responsibility for, religion.121  If this is the case, 
it would then follow that such programs do not impair rights of 
conscience.  Considering the Memorial and Remonstrance in the light of 
Galston’s concept of expressive liberty buttresses this conclusion.  Recall 
that Madison wrote the Memorial and Remonstrance in response to Patrick 
Henry’s A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teacher’s of the Christian Religion.  
As the title of the bill suggests, Henry was proposing a property tax to 
explicitly fund the teaching of Christianity.122  Had Henry’s bill become 
law, it would have violated Madison’s injunction against government 
taking congnizance of religion and clearly hindered the “ability of 
individuals and groups to live in ways consistent with their 
understanding of what gives meaning and purpose to life. . . .”123  We 
need not speculate on just how much Henry’s bill would have interfered 
with the liberty of various Christian groups or denominations, for it 
plainly would have violated the expressive liberty of non-Christians, 
who would have been taxed for the support of a faith not their own.  
Requiring non-Christians to support Christianity undeniably interferes 
with their ability to live in a way that reflects their judgments about what 
gives value and meaning to their lives.  Henry’s bill was thus unlike 
contemporary government assistance programs in which individuals are 
not taxed for the support of religion but for the provision of legitimate 
                                                 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 82–114. 
122 Muñoz, supra note 82, at 21. 
123 Galston, supra note 118, at 177. 
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governmental services such as educational and disability services.124  In 
Madisonian terms, government has not taken cognizance of religion.    
Justice Souter claims, mantra-like, that the outlay of neutral public 
funds to religious schools violates freedom of conscience.  He makes this 
assertion as though the claim alone were a trump.  Even if we assume, 
with Justice Souter, that the First Amendment embodies Jefferson’s and 
Madison’s views to the exclusion of all others, he fails to explain why we 
should accept their views on the relationship between church and state 
when we have rejected their views on the proper scope of the latter.125  
Furthermore, Muñoz’s and Blasi’s writings on the Memorial and 
Remonstrance provide strong reason to doubt that Justice Souter has 
correctly understood Madison’s principles of religious liberty.126  Finally, 
I have suggested that in order to establish an actual violation of rights of 
conscience, there must be some denial of what Galston calls expressive 
liberty, which is absent in the neutral funding cases.127 
 B. Saving Religion from Its Own Corruption 
The second reason Justice Souter gives in support of the claim that 
the Constitution confines religion to the private sphere is that the First 
Amendment aims also to protect the purity of religion from corruption.  
Like his claim about freedom of conscience, Justice Souter’s argument 
about protecting religion from corruption rests upon Madison’s Memorial 
and Remonstrance.  One of the reasons Madison opposed Henry’s bill was 
his belief that “ecclesiastical establishments” corrupted “the purity and 
efficacy of Religion” by producing “pride and indolence in the Clergy, 
ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and 
persecution.”128  Justice Souter does not claim that the threat today to the 
purity of religion is quite the same as in Madison’s day.  Instead, he 
argues that the integrity of religion is threatened by “corrosive 
secularism” that jeopardizes the ability of religious schools “to educate 
the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of their 
faith.”129  His concern is that government regulations accompanying 
public funds will undermine the particular identity of religious schools 
that receive public funds.  That is, the corruption of religion that Justice 
                                                 
124 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
125 See supra text accompanying notes 74–80 (emphasis added). 
126 See supra text accompanying notes 82–114. 
127 See supra text accompanying notes 115–24. 
128 Madison, supra note 83, at 83.  Justice Souter quotes a portion of Article 7 of Memorial 
and Remonstrance in Zelman.  536 U.S. 639, 712 (2002). 
129 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 712. 
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Souter believes the Establishment Clause protects against constitutes the 
compromises the faithful might make with their own beliefs in order to 
qualify for public funds.  He cites the voucher program at issue in 
Zelman, which prohibits religious discrimination and prevents 
participating religious schools from favoring students of the school’s 
faith in the admissions process.130  Justice  Souter speculates that the 
prospect of additional state funding may ultimately lead religious 
schools to exchange their relative independence and particular identities 
for increased public money.131  
That religious beliefs and identities might be undermined by the 
acceptance of public funds is certainly a valid concern, and it is a topic 
that deserves more attention than I can devote here.  However, several 
points are worth noting.  First, one doubts that Justice Souter and other 
adherents of the privatization thesis truly grasp the problem that an 
expansive regulatory state presents to religious believers who wish to 
safeguard the integrity of their faith.  For example, does not the state’s 
monopoly on education funds exert substantial pressure on the religious 
to compromise their beliefs?  As Eugene Volokh has observed:  
[M]any religious parents object on religious grounds to 
many aspects of the curriculum and environment in 
government-run public schools.  The offer of a free 
education in government-run school[s] puts these 
parents to the choice of (1) taking this government 
subsidy and compromising their religious objections to 
the curriculum or environment or (2) sticking by their 
beliefs but losing the subsidy. . . .132  
The prevalence of religious schools in this country indicates that many 
families are unwilling to compromise their religious beliefs.  However, 
the inability to afford religious schooling undoubtedly leads many 
religious parents to accept the subsidy and compromise their beliefs.133   
If the Establishment Clause is intended to prevent states from 
placing individuals in a situation in which they will be tempted to 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 715. 
132 Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 341, 364 (1999). 
133 On a related point, Justice Stevens has gone so far as to suggest that public schooling 
should be an instrument for educating children away from inherited religious beliefs.  Bd. 
of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 711 (1994) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
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compromise their religious beliefs, as Justice Souter maintains, then it 
would seem that public schooling itself violates the Establishment 
Clause.  If the threat of secularism to religious belief is the concern, how 
much more of a threat must this be in the context of public schooling, 
given its pervasively secular character?  Thus, denying parents the 
option of spending neutrally available education funds in religious 
schools would hardly begin to remedy the problem the secular state 
presents to the integrity of religious belief.  In short, concern that 
governmental policies may lead individuals to compromise their 
religious beliefs must also concede that the existing structure of 
schooling already leads to just this result.     
While Justice Souter ignores the more widespread threat to religious 
belief that secular public schooling presents, the possibility nevertheless 
exists that legislatures will permit families to direct neutral educational 
funds only to religious schools willing to bend their religious beliefs.  As 
Justice Souter points out, for example, religious schools participating in 
the Cleveland voucher program cannot favor students of the schools’ 
faith in the admissions process.134  Although this relatively mild 
qualification does not interfere with religious instruction in the schools, 
one wonders if the Supreme Court itself is not mainly responsible for 
restrictions of this type and for more onerous ones like the Milwaukee 
voucher program, where religious schools are forbidden from requiring 
voucher students to participate in religious activities.135  That is, the 
Court’s many Establishment Clause pronouncements have not provided 
clear guidance for legislatures.  And until its decision in Zelman, the 
constitutional fate of vouchers was unsettled. 
Perhaps the limitation on religious schools in Cleveland and 
Milwaukee were simply good faith efforts by policymakers, given the 
state of law at the time, to structure the scholarship programs in a way 
most likely to ensure that they passed the inevitable constitutional 
scrutiny.  In other words, it is not clear that legislatures will inevitably 
seek to undermine the religious identity of religious schools.136  This is 
                                                 
134 See supra text accompanying note 130. 
135 Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). 
136 One might argue, in fact, that some legislatures have been far more sensitive to 
religious identity and diversity than the Supreme Court.  For example, the Supreme Court 
has rejected legislative attempts to accommodate the needs of religious children.  Grumet, 
512 U.S. 687 (striking a New York law creating a school district for the public education of 
handicapped children of the Satmar Hasidic sect); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) 
(forbidding the use of state and federal aid to employ public school teachers in religious 
schools for teaching remedial, enrichment, and special education courses); Grand Rapids 
Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (also forbidding the use of state and federal aid to 
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especially so given that the Zelman decision itself does not appear to 
require religious schools to be so hamstrung as a condition for 
participating in neutral public programs.  Zelman clarifies that when 
recipients of neutral public aid direct that aid to religious schools, the 
promotion of religion is attributable to the free and independent choices 
of the recipients, not to the state.137  Thus, there appears to be no 
Establishment Clause requirement that religious schools trim their 
principles in order to participate in neutral funding programs.138   
Finally, one must note the off-putting paternalism present in Justice 
Souter’s claim that the Establishment Clause prohibits the participation 
of religious schools in neutral public programs to protect the integrity of 
religion.  An expansive regulatory state presents a real danger to the 
vitality of religious belief, but, as I have suggested, prohibiting religious 
                                                                                                             
employ public school teachers in religious schools for teaching remedial, enrichment, and 
special education courses); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (forbidding public 
schools from loaning instructional materials to religious schools, and prohibiting religious 
schools from using public funds to cover field trip transportation costs); Meek v. Pittenger, 
421 U.S. 349 (1975) (forbidding government-owned instructional materials to be loaned to 
religious schools, and prohibiting the provision of state-funded auxiliary services, such as 
counseling and speech and hearing therapy); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 757 (1973) (striking a New York law that provided various forms of 
public assistance to secular and religious private schools); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971) (invalidating state laws that supplemented the salaries of teachers teaching secular 
subjects in religious schools); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (objecting to 
religious schools using instructional equipment and materials purchased with government 
funds); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (objecting to publicly-funded remedial, 
enrichment, and special education in religious schools); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. 
Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14–21 (1993) (Blackmun, O’Connor, JJ., dissenting) (objecting to a state-
employed sign-language interpreter assisting a deaf student enrolled in a Roman Catholic 
high school).  This is not to deny that legislatures may sometimes act oppressively against 
religion.  However, such treatment of religion could not be justified by claiming that the 
Establishment Clause requires it. 
137 See supra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
138 While Establishment Clause concerns do not seem to be a valid basis for requiring 
religious schools to alter their principles as a condition for participating in neutral public 
programs, there nevertheless may be valid public policy concerns justifying the exclusion 
of a religious school from neutral public programs because of the school’s religious 
principles.  See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (affirming the 
Internal Revenue Service’s interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code to deny tax-exempt 
status to religious colleges and secondary and elementary schools that practice racial 
discrimination).  It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the question of whether 
public policy concerns may entitle the state to deny religious schools the ability to 
participate in neutral public programs.  Consequently, I do not address the extent to which 
the state may burden religion by means of religiously neutral laws.  See Employment Div. 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (finding no Free Exercise Clause violation in a neutrally-
applicable state criminal law that burdened the religious practices of the Native American 
Church). 
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schools from participating in neutral public programs hardly begins to 
address the issue.139  More fundamentally, Justice Souter’s position 
appears to presume that the faithful cannot be trusted to preserve their 
religion and that Supreme Court Justices care more for the faith of the 
religious than do the religious themselves.  I do not doubt the 
genuineness of Justice Souter’s concern over the threat that “corrosive 
secularism” poses for religious belief.  However, I do question the 
presumption that the faithful cannot be trusted to safeguard their faith 
and thus that it is the responsibility of political elites to guard it for them.  
Putting aside the reasonableness or constitutionality of legislatures 
requiring religious schools to relax their religious principles in order to 
participate in neutral public programs, if religious communities are 
willing to abide by the terms legislators have established for such 
programs, should not their decision be respected?  Are not the faithful 
themselves in a much better position to judge the threat, or lack of threat, 
to their religion that accompanies participation in government 
programs?  A religious community might, of course, misjudge and find 
that participation does jeopardize its beliefs and integrity, but Justice 
Souter might also misjudge and see a threat where one does not exist.  
Upon recognizing that participation does tug too sharply towards 
secularism, a religious school or community would, presumably, be free 
to withdraw from the program.  However, how is the error corrected 
when religious schools are denied the opportunity to participate in 
neutral public programs on the mistaken belief that the exclusion is 
necessary to safeguard the purity of religion?  
A critic might concede that the Supreme Court’s paternalism will at 
times be mistaken and that it will “protect” religion when no protection 
is required, but nevertheless respond that the stakes are too high for the 
Court to avoid paternalism.  In other words, protecting the purity of 
religion, or religious pluralism,140 outweighs the interest that religious 
communities have in deciding whether to accept the terms being offered.  
It is better to have a blanket prohibition to safeguard all religion, one 
might argue, even if the protection is unnecessary in some cases.  
However well-meaning this position is, we still must ask whether heavy-
handed paternalism is warranted.  I believe it is not.  I see no basis for 
the presumption that religious communities cannot protect themselves.  
Participation, individually and institutionally, in neutral governmental 
programs such as the Cleveland voucher program, is voluntary.  It is not 
                                                 
139 See supra text accompanying notes 132–33. 
140 See Blasi, supra note 89, at 796 (discussing Madison’s belief in “the value of religious 
pluralism”). 
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a case of the state commandeering the religious schools and forcing their 
participation.   
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, should we not assume 
that these schools agreed to participate, fully aware of the terms of the 
program, on conditions that they presumably found acceptable?  How 
religious schools in Milwaukee responded to the opportunity to 
participate in that city’s voucher program is instructive.  The Milwaukee 
program prohibits religious schools from requiring voucher students to 
participate in religious activity.141  Many religious schools declined to 
become voucher schools on the grounds that the restriction would 
interfere with their religious mission.142  However, other schools 
concluded that the constraint poses no threat to their religious mission 
and thus accept voucher students.143  As long as religious institutions are 
not obligated to participate in public programs, which would likely 
violate the Free Exercise Clause, and as long as they are free to withdraw 
from such programs, I see no reason why the judgment of Supreme 
Court Justices should prevail over the judgments of the religious 
themselves.  In any case, the experience of religious schools eligible to 
participate in Milwaukee’s voucher program seems to confirm that 
religious officials are capable of judging for themselves the threat that 
participation in government programs poses for their religion and 
institutions.     
A related reason for rejecting Justice Souter’s paternalism is that he is 
doing the very thing the Supreme Court has forbidden in other contexts.  
That is, in arguing that the religious schools participating in Cleveland’s 
voucher program have compromised their beliefs by accepting the 
preference restriction,144 Justice Souter is making judgments about 
whether a religious community’s beliefs are consistent with particular 
religious doctrines.  However, the decision in Presbyterian Church v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church145 prohibits judicial 
excursions into theology, as the Court declared that it was 
                                                 
141 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
142 Joe Loconte, Paying the Piper:  Will Vouchers Undermine the Mission of Religious Schools?, 
93 POL’Y REV. 30 (1999).  The principal of one Lutheran school explained that his school’s 
unwillingness to participate in the voucher program was due to the restriction, which 
school authorities believed “would compromise [the school’s] mission as a Christian 
school.”  Id. at 31.  Loconte notes that a nationwide survey of private schools conducted in 
1998 by the U.S. Department of Education “found that few sectarian schools would join 
voucher programs that allowed exemptions from religious instruction or activities.”  Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 712 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
145 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969). 
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unconstitutional for “civil courts to engage in the forbidden process of 
interpreting and weighing church doctrine.”146  Presbyterian Church 
involved a dispute over church property between two local churches and 
the national denomination that turned on whether certain actions of the 
latter “depart[ed] substantially” from church doctrine.147  If such a 
departure was found, a second determination had to be made regarding 
how significant the departures were to church doctrine.  In other words, 
the judiciary was asked “to determine matters at the very core of a 
religion—the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the 
importance of those doctrines to the religion.”148  “Plainly,” the Court 
declared, “the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a 
role.”149   
But is this not precisely the role Justice Souter is playing when he 
claims that participation in the voucher program has compromised the 
beliefs of the religious schools?  Such a claim, after all, is a claim that the 
schools have departed from church doctrine.  To illustrate the point, let 
us focus on Catholicism and the fact that at the time of the Zelman 
litigation, thirty-five of the forty-six religious schools, out of a total of 
fifty-six participating private schools enrolling voucher students, were 
Catholic schools.150  To conclude that the Catholic schools had 
compromised their religion, Justice Souter must compare the schools’ 
willingness to abide by the terms of the program against the teachings of 
the Catholic Church.  He must engage in theology to interpret and weigh 
Catholic teachings, and he must do the same with religious traditions 
and doctrines of other religious schools that accept voucher students.  
However, as Presbyterian Church makes clear, the Free Exercise Clause 
prevents courts from becoming embroiled in theological matters and 
from attempting to tell the faithful how to understand their own faith.      
Beyond this structural restraint denying the Supreme Court and all 
civil courts the authority to act as theologians, we may also question 
whether Justices and judges possess the knowledge and insight requisite 
for theological undertakings.  In other words, how does Justice Souter 
know when a particular religious community has compromised its 
principles?  Is he or the Court generally so well-versed in the theologies 
of the various religious traditions in this country that he or it is in a 
position to say to a religious community that it has violated its own 
                                                 
146 Id. at 451. 
147 Id. at 450. 
148 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450. 
149 Id. 
150 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 681 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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principles?  Justice Souter believes that the religious voucher schools in 
Cleveland have compromised their principles in order to qualify for the 
program.  Undoubtedly, he would say the same of religious schools in 
Milwaukee, which must abide by the more serious limitation that 
permits voucher students to opt out of religious instruction and 
activities.  Such a conclusion contradicts the self-understanding of at 
least the Catholic schools in Milwaukee, most of which are participating 
in the voucher program.151  As the principal of one Milwaukee Catholic 
high school stated, the opt-out provision did not interfere with the 
school’s ability to “maintain [its] independence and [its] mission.”152  
Thus, what may appear to an outsider, such as Justice Souter, to be a case 
of a religious community compromising its beliefs in order to qualify for 
public funds, may instead be nothing of the sort to the community.  
Justice Souter aptly demonstrates that “[i]t is not within the judicial ken 
to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or 
the validity of [a] particular [believers’] interpretation[] of [their] 
creeds.”153   
One may reasonably doubt that Justice Souter actually practices 
theology and that he does not interpret and evaluate religious principles 
that would be necessary to conclude that religious voucher schools have 
compromised their beliefs.  That is, there is no evidence in his Zelman 
opinion that he actually made any theological determinations, which is 
just as well because he is not a theologian.  Instead, the “compromise” 
claim is a bald assertion that the faithful have been unfaithful and that 
they have violated their religious beliefs.  It is an accusation that the 
religious have been unfaithful to their God and to what their God 
requires of them.  It is a very serious charge.154  But what leads Justice 
                                                 
151 Loconte, supra note 142, at 31. 
152 Id. (quoting the principal). 
153 Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). 
154 Lest the reader think that I have exaggerated Justice Souter’s claim that the religious 
have compromised their religious beliefs, reproduced below is the pertinent passage from 
Zelman. In the founding era, Justice Souter writes, the corruption of religion was manifest 
in: 
‘[P]ride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the 
laity[,] in both superstition, bigotry and persecution’; in the 21st 
century, the risk is one of ‘corrosive secularism’ to religious schools, 
and the specific threat is to the primacy of the schools’ mission to 
educate the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts 
of their faith.  Even ‘the favored religion may be compromised as 
political figures reshape the religion’s beliefs for their own purposes; it 
may be reformed as government largesse brings government 
regulation.’  The risk is already being realized . . . [in the Cleveland 
program]. 
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Souter and the other Justices who joined his dissent to make such a 
serious charge, especially when no evidence is offered to indicate that 
voucher schools have compromised their faith?  Justice Souter indicates 
that the schools’ willingness to accept the restriction preventing them 
from preferring same-faith students represents a compromise of belief.  
However, as I have noted, he cannot know this without weighing and 
evaluating the doctrines of the religion at issue, which he does not do 
and he is forbidden to do.  Consequently, he cannot know whether any 
of the schools have compromised their beliefs by accepting the same-
faith preference restriction.  Why then the cavalier assertion that they 
have?  It seems to me that the claim is simply a form of moral badgering 
intended to shame and condemn religious believers who would permit 
their institutions to participate in neutral public programs.  His aim 
seems to be to discourage such participation and to instill in the public 
consciousness the notion that religious institutions necessarily betray 
their religion when they participate in neutral public programs.  In the 
end, Justice Souter’s motivations for the severe allegation he makes are 
unclear.  However, if the Constitution denies courts the authority to 
“interpret[] and weigh[] church doctrine,”155 surely the Supreme Court 
Justices should thus refrain from accusing the religious of betraying their 
God.   
As I noted above, the premise that policymakers may seek to 
secularize religious institutions as a prerequisite to their participating in 
neutral programs is a legitimate concern.  However, I have argued that 
by ignoring the threat the state’s monopoly on education funds presents 
to religious belief, Justice Souter indicates that he does not truly 
understand the secularization problem.  Instead of chastising individuals 
and groups who would seek to secularize religious schools, Justice 
Souter adopts a deeply paternalistic stance that seeks to deny religious 
schools the opportunity to participate in neutral educational programs.  
Such paternalism is unwarranted because religious believers appear 
quite capable of judging for themselves the threat that participation 
presents to their religious beliefs.  In addition to his paternalism, Justice 
Souter’s concern about religious purity requires a theological 
undertaking, which, in other contexts, the Court has acknowledged that 
it is ill-equipped for and the First Amendment forbids. 
                                                                                                             
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 712 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
155 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 451 (1969). 
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C. Prevention of Social Conflict 
The third pillar supporting the privatization commitment is the 
claim that the Establishment Clause confines religion to the private 
sphere because of “its inextricable link with social conflict.”156  To be 
sure, this is a position “that once occupied the Court” but has now been 
“rightly disregarded.”157  Nevertheless, those Justices committed to the 
privatization of religion cling to it, arguing that religion in the public 
sphere will lead to social conflict as religious groups vie for public funds 
to support their institutions and as “taxpayers who take their liberty of 
conscience seriously” mobilize to prevent such expenditures.158  As with 
the concern over rights of conscience and the potential for religion to 
become corrupted, social peace is certainly an important matter.  
However, the problem is that the historical and social analysis offered in 
support of the claim is wholly unpersuasive.  In fact, it is perhaps an 
overstatement to argue that the social conflict claim rests on any 
meaningful analysis at all.   
Although it is claimed that the prevention of religiously-motivated 
social conflict is one of the aims of the Establishment Clause, it is 
revealing that one finds no reference by any of the Justices espousing this 
position to any original source.  For example, Justice Souter cites only 
other Supreme Court opinions, which fail to marshal any founding era 
arguments.159  Moreover, as Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., argues, this 
particular claim about the Establishment Clause is of recent vintage. 160  
Gaffney documents that it was first hinted at by Justice Harlan in his 
concurring opinion in Walz v. Tax Commission161 in 1970.  The next year, 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,162 a majority of the Court claimed it as one of the 
motivations behind the adoption of the First Amendment.163  Writing for 
the Court in Lemon, Chief Justice Burger argued that “political division 
                                                 
156 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718–22 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (presenting the same argument as Justice Souter with specific 
attention to cases involving religion and education); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 872 
(2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (briefly recounting cases in which the Court has invoked the 
religious strife rationale). 
157 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 825 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion). 
158 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
159 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 715 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 872 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
160 Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines:  The 
Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 205 
(1980). 
161 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
162 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
163 Gaffney, supra note 160, at 209–12. 
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along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First 
Amendment was intended to protect.”164  As Gaffney notes, neither 
Justice Harlan nor Chief Justice Burger reference any founding era 
arguments or sources in support of their assertion about the intent of the 
Establishment Clause.165  Instead, both rely on a 1969 Harvard Law 
Review article, which itself is “unadorned with any reference to primary 
sources.”166  After reviewing congressional debates over the First 
Amendment and the writings of Jefferson and Madison, Gaffney argues 
that the historical record cannot bear the weight of the social conflict 
claim.  The historical record, Gaffney writes, is devoid of evidence 
indicating that “the founding fathers perceived political divisions along 
religious lines as an evil and that they intended to avoid such conflicts by 
enacting the First Amendment.”167  Given that the Establishment Clause 
appears to be a jurisdictional statement explicitly affirming that the new 
Constitution did not withdraw from the states’ authority  over 
religion,168 it is not surprising that Gaffney would reach this conclusion.   
Not only does the alleged prevention-of-social-conflict motivation 
for the Establishment Clause lack a credible historical foundation, as 
social policy it is a solution in search of a problem.  That is, religion has 
had a place in the public sphere throughout our nation’s history, and it 
has engendered no deep or enduring social conflict.  Consider only the 
post-New Deal American political culture.  As Justice O’Connor points 
out in her Zelman concurrence, substantial public funds have long been 
channeled to religious institutions “through public health programs such 
as Medicare . . . and Medicaid . . . through educational programs such as 
the Pell Grant program . . . and the G.I. Bill of Rights . . . and through 
childcare programs such as the Child Care and Development Block 
Grant Program.”169  Religious institutions have additionally long 
                                                 
164 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971). 
165 Gaffney, supra note 160, at 210, 214. 
166 Id. at 214. (referring to Paul A. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 
1680 (1969)). 
167 Id. at 223.  Gaffney adds that not only can Madison not be put into service for the 
political divisiveness rationale, but that Madison actually encouraged, both theoretically 
and practically, religiously-motivated political divisions.  In support of this argument, 
Gaffney cites Madison’s argument in Federalist No. 10 that civil and religious liberty would 
be safeguarded by competition among different “interests” and “sects.”  Further, Gaffney 
notes that in his battle to defeat Patrick Henry’s bill to support the teaching of Christianity, 
Madison “explicitly appealed to a wide coalition of religious dissidents in Virginia, 
principally Baptists and Presbyterians, to oppose the views of the established Episcopalian 
Church. . . .”  Id. at 222. 
168 See supra note 73. 
169 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 666–68 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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benefited, albeit indirectly, from tax policies permitting tax deductions 
for contributions made to qualified religious organizations, education 
policies establishing tax credits for educational expenses, including those 
incurred at religious schools, and exemptions from state property taxes 
for property owned by religious institutions.170  The annual value of the 
foregoing benefits is well into the billions of dollars,171 but one is hard 
pressed to identify any divisive political conflict provoked by these 
examples of religion in the public sphere.172 
Consequently, just as the claim that the founders intended the 
Establishment Clause to be a safeguard against religiously-motivated 
political divisiveness is free of any founding era references or arguments, 
the arguments about the divisiveness of religion in the public sphere are 
likewise free of any meaningful American examples of religiously-
motivated political divisions.  Rather, there  are the standard references 
to seventeenth century European religious conflicts and the established 
churches in colonial America that persisted into the nineteenth 
century.173  The state-established churches in the late 1700s and early 
1800s were politically divisive, but these conflicts are inapposite to the 
evaluation of the divisiveness of religious institutions participating in 
religiously-neutral public programs within the context of an expansive 
regulatory state.  If religiously-motivated social conflict were truly a 
problem requiring the privatization of religion, one would expect to find 
examples of it accompanying the public programs noted in the preceding 
paragraph wherein billions of public dollars have directly and indirectly 
aided religion.   
The lack of meaningful American examples of religious conflict 
explains why Justice Souter and other privatization Justices do not 
reference any, and this perhaps helps us to understand why Justice 
Stevens now also looks to contemporary international conflicts to 
                                                 
170 Id. at 665–66 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
171 See id. at 665–68. 
172 Noting this, Bradley wrote—in 1986, when the divisiveness rationale commanded the 
support of a majority of Justices—that the: 
Court is clearly engaged in an entirely prophylactic effort, one that has 
constitutionalized the relationship of church to state without any 
empirical confirmation of the “evil” that assertedly justifies it.  
Requiring just a “clear and present danger” of sectarian strife, for 
instance, would eliminate the “divisiveness” rationale from every case 
that ever employed it. 
Bradley, supra note 1, at 303. 
173 See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 
U.S. 1, 8 (1947). 
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support his claim that religion must be confined to the private sphere.  
That is, Justice Stevens’s opposition to religion in the public sphere is 
based not only on his “understanding of the impact of religious strife on 
the decisions of our forbears to migrate to this continent” but also on 
“the decisions of neighbors in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the 
Middle East to mistrust one another.”174  One wonders which is the more 
curious, Justice Stevens’s reduction of complex political, ethnic, and 
religious differences to simply religious disputes or his belief that the 
political strife in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East is 
somehow instructive for gauging the constitutionality of neutral, public, 
American programs.   
My comments here should not be understood as an uncritical, 
unqualified endorsement of religion in the public square or as a denial 
that religion holds any potential for social harm.  Clearly it does.  Human 
history is replete with instances of great evil committed in the name of 
religion.175  My contention is simply that religion has always had some 
involvement in the public sphere in this country and yet the American 
experience has been one largely free of serious, lasting religious conflict.  
This claim is reinforced, I believe, by the failure of the privatization 
Justices to identify any consequential American examples of such 
divisiveness.      
One might concede my point about the American history of many 
religions and of no religion living together more or less peacefully but 
argue that religious school vouchers, as in Zelman, are different.  For 
instance, one could claim that the lack of any serious social conflict over 
neutral tax, higher education, healthcare, and childcare policies is 
uninstructive for evaluating the potential political divisiveness of school 
choice programs.  This is essentially Justice Breyer’s position, who 
concedes that the “consequence [of religion in the public sphere] has not 
been great turmoil” but argues that “[s]chool voucher programs 
differ . . . in both kind and degree from” other types of neutral aid 
programs.176  Vouchers differ in kind because they “direct financing to a 
core function of the church:  the teaching of religious truths to young 
children,” which is “far more contentious than providing funding for 
                                                 
174 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
175 See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment 
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 297–318 (2001) (focusing largely on the issue of schooling).  
See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 191-478 (2002) 
(recounting fierce anti-Catholicism surrounding schooling and other public policy debates 
from the mid-nineteenth century into the twentieth century). 
176 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 726 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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secular textbooks, computers, vocational training, or even funding for 
adults who wish to obtain a college education at a religious 
university.”177  He also contends, without referencing any historical 
examples, that “history also shows that government involvement in 
religious primary education is far more divisive” than any tax or 
healthcare programs that happen to benefit religion.178  Vouchers differ 
in degree from other aid programs the Court has endorsed in that other 
programs provided only “limited amounts of aid,” whereas vouchers 
involve “a considerable shift of taxpayer dollars from public secular 
schools to private religious schools.”179   
While Justice Breyer is correct about how vouchers differ from other 
types of public aid, it is unclear that vouchers will generate any more 
political division—that is to say, any political division—than have the 
more limited aid programs the Court has approved of in recent years.180  
This of course is not to say that vouchers are uncontroversial or that 
some segments of American society do not ardently resist them, but that 
the divisiveness reasoning is fundamentally flawed and has been since it 
was first articulated in 1970.  It is flawed because the public debate over 
public aid to religious schools is not about religion or religious truths.  
Instead, it is a debate about political principles—chiefly, what justice and 
equality require regarding schooling in a free society.181  Essentially, the 
disagreement over public aid to religious schools implicates no religious 
values, only political values.  It is a political dispute carried on by 
ordinary political means.  What advocates of school vouchers and other 
aid programs seek is not the establishment of a religious truth or some 
religious orthodoxy, but an end to the state’s monopoly over education 
funds.  As Gerard Bradley argues, the issue of public aid to religious 
schools “has never been agitated in a way distinguishable from political 
conflict generally, and the Court has done nothing except assert, without 
a scintilla of evidence, the contrary.”182  To be sure, religion is in the 
background, but in a religious society such as ours, religion is in the 
background of virtually every political issue.  Yet, does not the American 
experience confirm that individuals and groups of different religions and 
                                                 
177 Id. at 726–27. 
178 Id. at 727. 
179 Id. 
180 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (emphasis added). 
181 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); STEPHEN MACEDO, 
DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST:  CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000); 
Kevin Pybas, Liberalism and Civic Education:  Unitary Versus Pluralist Alternatives, 33 PERSP. 
ON POL. SCI. 18 (2004). 
182 Bradley, supra note 1, at 304. 
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of no religion are capable of living together more or less peacefully?  This 
point seems conceded by the failure of the privatization Justices to point 
to any meaningful American examples of religiously-motivated political 
strife and by Justice Breyer’s acknowledgement that no previous aid 
program has generated any such conflict.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Souter and other Justices stubbornly insist that the aim of the 
Establishment Clause is to restrict religion to the private sphere.  The 
arguments in support of this conclusion, respecting the rights of 
conscience, preventing the corruption of religion, and preserving social 
peace, are unpersuasive.  It is my contention that analysis of these issues 
by the privatization Justices is largely perfunctory and that no real 
examination of the issues takes place.  Instead of a meaningful analysis 
of religious liberty, the privatization thesis rests upon the following:  (1) 
conclusory statements about rights of conscience, including a misreading 
of Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance;183 (2) a misguided paternalism 
requiring the Court to weigh and evaluate religious doctrines, which 
ignores the threat that the state’s monopolization of public education 
funds presents to religion and wrongly assumes that religious 
institutions participating in neutral government programs are incapable 
of safeguarding their faith;184 and (3) seeks to protect the nation from a 
religiously-inspired social conflict, which is largely an imaginary 
problem.185   
To further illustrate the thinness of the claim that the Establishment 
Clause banishes religion to the private sphere, consider the treatment of 
“public sphere” and “private sphere” by the privatization Justices.  
Interpreting the Establishment Clause to require that religion be 
restricted to the private sphere follows this syllogism: 
The Establishment Clause embodies Jefferson’s A Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom and Madison’s Memorial 
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.  These 
texts reflect the belief that religion should be confined to 
the private sphere.  No public funds may therefore be 
used for religious purposes, even when such funds reach 
religious institutions only as a result of the free and 
independent choices of aid recipients. 
                                                 
183 See supra Part III.A. 
184 See supra Part III.B. 
185 See supra Part III.C. 
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The problem with this syllogism is:  The easy assumption of the minor 
premise that the term “private sphere” has the same meaning today as it 
did for Jefferson and Madison.  Insofar as I can determine, the Supreme 
Court has never explicitly defined what it means by the use of “private 
sphere” and “public sphere.”  However, it seems that the Court equates 
government and its activities with the public sphere and that the private 
sphere consists of those areas of life that government has not wholly 
regulated.  In essence, the private sphere consists of the aspects of life 
where we are relatively unconstrained to live according to our own best 
lights.   
If we understand “public sphere” to mean nothing more than 
whatever government does, as the Supreme Court seems to interpret it, 
then it is axiomatic that the public sphere has come to dwarf the private 
sphere.  The privatization Justices thus trivialize religion by refusing to 
confront this fact.  Jefferson and Madison understood their principles as 
expanding the sphere of human liberty.  In contrast, crudely insisting 
that religion must be limited to the private sphere in contemporary 
circumstances of an expansive managerial state reduces the sphere of 
human liberty.  Consider only the example of public aid to religious 
schools, which comprises much of the Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.  All citizens are taxed for the benefit of education, but 
under the privatization of religion interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause, religious schools are denied any meaningful public support.  
Government schools alone are entitled to the educational tax proceeds.  
Such a scheme clearly results in a reduction of liberty for families who 
wish to provide their children an education unavailable in state schools.  
To be sure, such families have the liberty to send their children to 
religious schools,186 but the privatization principle denies them the 
opportunity to draw on the educational fund to which they have 
contributed.   
It is thus rather formalistic and crude to reflexively demand that 
religion be confined to the private sphere without contextually 
considering whether liberty will be promoted or impeded.187  The 
unwillingness to wrestle with such a crucial issue is emblematic of the 
refusal of those Justices who seek to confine religion to the private 
sphere to seriously engage difficult issues of religious liberty.  The 
                                                 
186 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
187 I am not suggesting that the restraint of liberty is always illegitimate.  Human liberty 
is restrained in various ways in liberal society, generally in the service of some broader 
social good. 
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casualness with which these Justices claim that the Constitution requires 
religion to be restricted to the private sphere suggests almost an 
eagerness to constrain religion.  Instead of the result of a careful 
constitutional inquiry, the conclusion that religion must be confined to 
the private sphere seems indicative of an a priori negative judgment 
about religion—as something unimportant, possibly dangerous, and 
requiring no serious analysis.188  Particularly underscoring this point is 
the fact that privatization Justices seem incapable of drawing any 
favorable conclusions from religion’s long involvement in the public 
sphere, an association without lasting social conflict.189  Refusing to 
notice this, they dogmatically insist that religion must be confined to the 
private sphere to avoid a largely nonexistent problem. 
In criticizing the privatization claim, I should not be understood as 
advocating any particular boundary between religion and the state.  I 
hope to have shown that the privatization thesis is remarkably 
unpersuasive, as it has little to do with either founding era arguments 
                                                 
188 In a manuscript in progress, I suggest that the belief that religion must be confined to 
the private sphere is part of a comprehensive philosophical commitment about religion, 
individual, and social flourishing that is rooted in an understanding of the liberal political 
tradition that William Galston calls “autonomy-centered.”  See supra note 11.  Autonomy-
centered liberalism, Galston argues, promotes “individual self-direction in at least one of 
many senses explored by John Locke, Immanual Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Americans 
writing in an Emersonian vein [and] is frequently linked with the commitment to sustained 
rational examination of self, others, and social practices.”  GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM 21 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).  Autonomy-centered liberalism is: 
[L]inked to an historical impulse often associated with the 
Enlightenment—namely, liberation through reason from externally 
imposed authority.  Within this context, reason is understood as the 
prime source of authority; the examined life is understood as superior 
to reliance on tradition or faith; preference is to be given to self-
direction over external determination; and appropriate relationships to 
conceptions of good or of value, and especially conceptions that 
constitute groups, are held to originate only through acts of conscious 
individual reflection on and commitment to such conceptions. 
Id. at 24.  Galston argues further that a number of cultural and political conflicts today are 
the result of “the decision to throw state power behind the promotion of individual 
autonomy,” which tends to “undermine individuals and groups that do not and cannot 
organize their affairs in accordance with that principle without undermining the deepest 
sources of their identity.”  Id.  The promotion of autonomy places the coercive powers of 
the state behind a partisan conception of the good life.  The state “takes sides in the 
ongoing struggle between reason and faith, reflection and tradition.  Autonomy-based 
arguments are bound to marginalize those individuals and groups who cannot 
conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment impulse.”  Id. at 25–26.  Autonomy-centered 
liberalism thus fails to take diversity seriously, and it often leads liberal societies to act “in 
ways that reduce diversity.”  William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516, 
522 (1995). 
189 See supra notes 169–74 and accompanying text. 
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that brought the Establishment Clause into existence or with an 
informed awareness that religion has been for the most part peacefully 
involved in the public sphere since the nation’s founding.  However, this 
does not mean that the state should promote religion with, for instance, 
official prayers and scripture readings in the public schools.  Rather, the 
point is that an uncritical commitment to confining religion to the private 
sphere leads Justice Souter and other Justices to hurry past, if not ignore, 
complex issues of religious liberty.  Instead of a searching inquiry into 
how religious liberty can be protected for all amidst deep religious 
diversity and an ever-expanding regulatory state, we get abstract, 
conclusory arguments about the purported meaning of the 
Establishment Clause.  Wherever the just boundary between religion and 
state may lie, neither our confidence in the Supreme Court’s ability to 
mark it nor the cause of religious liberty itself is furthered by dogmatic 
assertions that the Constitution requires religion to be confined to the 
private sphere. 
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